Author: Alf Thompson, The Earl of Northampton’s Regiment

Orders of the day, Volume 31, Issue 1, Jan/Feb 1999

The Nantwich Muster again hails the beginning of a New Year of Knotting. However in the eyes of many historians the New Year events of 1644 heralded the beginning of the end for the Royalist cause. The battle took place on 25th January 1644, the culmination of a sequence of extremely important events that turned the tide of the Civil War, and must be understood in relation to actions taking place elsewhere. As for the actual battle and outcome, a variety of factors contributed to a disastrous Royalist defeat.

The English Civil War is littered with a curious matrix of military genius, amateurs achieving master-strokes, ill judgement, bad luck and good fortune - Nantwich contained all these factors. If we add the role that the elements played in this conflict then we have a recipe for Royalist calamity. How one views which factors contributed most in relation to the outcome depends on how objective one can be. If you have Royalist allegiances then it might be seen as damning fortune and a dose of ‘lucky Fairfax’. If you are of the Parliamentary persuasion then it might be perceived as clever tactics with a hint of divine providence.

Setting The Scene

By the autumn of 1643 a stalemate had occurred in the English Civil War. It was twelve months after Edgehill and no decisive action had resulted in one side or the other gaining the upper hand. Each had gained and lost territorial advantages and each was attempting to hold strategic positions and consolidate, afraid to pregnate the heartland of the other, because to do so was to risk losing what they had held or gained. It was a chess game being played out on the English landscape. At the onset of the English Civil War Lancashire and Cheshire had divided loyalties, whilst North Wales was predominantly Royalist.

The Royalist strength in Lancashire and Cheshire had been weakened by sending resources and troops to support the main field armies. Parliament took advantage in both counties, and in Cheshire took the Royalist garrisons of Nantwich in January 1643 and Middlewich in March 1643. This was a bitter pill for the King, as Parliament was now gaining strongholds in Royalist heartland.

The loss of Nantwich and Middlewich was blamed on the incompetence of Sir Thomas Aston, the Colonel-General of Cheshire, and Lord Capel was appointed the new regional commander with a mandate to recover lost ground, but like Aston he was quickly viewed as a failure because he failed to achieve his objective. At this time John Lord Byron was in his ascendancy, following successful exploits as a cavalry commander in the Oxford Army. He was appointed Field Marshall General of North Wales and was sent to achieve what Capel had failed to do. However Byron, who moved north with some 1000 cavalry and between 300-500 infantry drawn from the Oxford Army, was not to act prematurely, but rather await reinforcements that were yet to set out.

Conspiring To Conquer

By the autumn of 1643 the conflict was at a stalemate and both sides believed that it could go on indefinitely. Each side wanted a winning solution sooner rather than later and both realised that this could only be achieved with outside help. By the autumn of 1643 Parliament were conspiring with the Scots to draw up and sign the Solemn League and Covenant. Offered terms that the King was ever reluctant to offer, the Scots promised an army that would intervene on the side of Parliament. The King was well aware of the negotiating and the potential threat to his cause. In turn he, through James Earl of Ormonde, had negotiated a peace treaty with the Irish Catholics so that he could release his army in Ireland and return his forces to England to fight a more immediate threat. This was a legitimate move by the King - the army in Ireland was an English army that had been fighting the cause against ‘popery’. Though Protestant Irish would have been conscripted, the vast majority of the Irish army was made up of Englishmen and Welshmen. This action is not to be confused with when the King later invoked the services of the Earl of Glamorgan (later Marquis of Worcester) to conspire with the Irish Catholics to send a Catholic army to fight on English soil against Englishmen. This became one of the major condemning charges of treachery brought against Charles at his trial. Therefore when we talk of an Irish army at this stage of the first Civil War we really mean the army from Ireland.

Brereton Triumphant

Just as the King was aware of Parliament’s dealings with the Scots, so too were Parliament aware of a pending threat from Ireland. Sir William Brereton, who had captured much of Cheshire for Parliament and discredited Aston and Capel, was about to make another forceful move. Knowing of the inevitable landing of the Irish army, he took prompt steps to combat the threat. Brereton had achieved a great deal with limited forces and he was about to achieve more. On 9th November 1643, supported by Colonel Thomas Mytton, he marched out of Nantwich with between 3-4,000 men. He was about to take a daring risk with such a small force. His goal was to bypass the Royalist stronghold of Chester and march into the Royalist territory of North Wales to form a bridge-head against invasion. Within a few weeks he had crossed the River Dee at Holt Bridge where he outwitted the

Lord John Byron	Sir William Brereton

Royalist garrison at Holt Castle, taken Wrexham and captured Howarden Castle. He positioned himself near Mostyn Hall which he had captured without much effort and awaited the expected landing. According to Brereton’s letters his aim was to attack the Irish army as it disembarked - to hit them on the beaches, so to speak.

Unfortunately for Brereton, Parliamentary reports suggested that the Irish army had Liverpool as its main target. The fear was that the ships would anchor off the Welsh coast, but head for Liverpool. The fear was a very real one for Brereton’s Lancastrian men, who made up half his small army and who now with their officers left Wales to secure their homes against the threat. Brereton could do no more than retreat back into Cheshire to await support from no obvious direction. He was now holding a lot of territory with very few men against a major threat.

The Irish Army Lands

Sometime between 21st and 24th November 1643 some twenty ships docked at Mostyn on the North Wales coast and landed the army from Ireland. The Irish army mobilised quickly and within days had retaken lost towns and garrisons along the Welsh coast. At Howarden Castle there emerged a colourful character synonymous with the Nantwich campaign, one Captain Thomas Sandford, a veteran of the Irish Wars and renowned for his commando tactics with a company of firelocks who originated from Welsh border towns. When the Howarden garrison left by Brereton requested parley, Sandford replied, “My firelocks use not to parley” ... and the garrison surrendered without terms. The Irish army re-garrisoned all that had been re-taken, as they followed Brereton’s tracks back through North Wales into Cheshire. The aim of the Irish army was to link up with Byron who had been awaiting their arrival, to secure Cheshire for the King, remove any threat to Chester and keep the North Wales coast open for Royalist shipping movements.

Having secured North Wales, the Irish army entered Chester to link up with Byron and obtain provisions. The Irish army were battle hardened, but also battle weary, ill-clothed and poorly resourced. Over £1,000 was raised from Royalist estates in Wales to re-cloth and re-shoe the army before it moved out of Chester on 11th December 1643, supported by Byron. At this point in the campaign Byron’s mobile force approximated 5,000 men - the immediate aim to capture Nantwich and secure Cheshire, and perhaps the long term aim to march north through England to support the Duke of Newcastle’s Northern Army against the pending threat of a Scots invasion.

Byron Triumphant

Byron began his march into Cheshire on 11th December with the aim of first isolating Nantwich prior to capturing it. On 13th December Captain Thomas Sandford conducted a daring raid on Beeston Castle which was considered an impregnable Parliamentary stronghold. Sandford, along with a small company of his firelocks, scaled the rock-face and climbed the castle walls. Having entered the castle the garrison believed they had been outwitted by a large force and surrendered. However the Castle Governor Thomas Steele entertained Sandford and his men by providing dinner and beer, rather than immediately marching out with honours. When Steele arrived at Nantwich with his story it seems the people of Nantwich felt that Beeston’s fall was less to do with Sandford’s daring exploits and more to do with Steele’s cowardice and betrayal, so they shot him dead behind Nantwich Church. For the next three weeks there was skirmishing throughout the Cheshire countryside and particularly in the vicinity of Nantwich where Byron was fighting with sallying parties sent from the garrison at Nantwich.

Bloody Byron

Byron was sweeping through Cheshire, his sights firmly on Nantwich, but he was also keeping an eye on Brereton’s movements. There was no point in throwing all his strength into an attack on Nantwich whilst there was a possibility of Brereton coming to the garrison’s aid. Brereton had managed to recruit the support of a limited force of Lancastrians and was hurriedly mustering strength at Middlewich.

However Byron was well aware of Brereton’s actions and surprised his forces by an all out assault on Middlewich on or around 27th December 1643. The attack, led by Byron’s brother Sir Robert, was wholly successful, though the Royalists lost men they could ill afford to lose. Brereton’s forces were completely routed and he lost over 500 men killed and captured. He retreated back to Manchester, urging Parliament in Westminster to send help with all speed or Cheshire would be lost and then Lancashire. Byron was considered ruthless in his zeal to wipe out Parliament in Cheshire as he adopted a scorched earth policy where resistance was encountered and put all to the sword who failed to surrender. This was particularly observed following his success at Middlewich and at an encounter at Barthomley when he burned down the church and had all Parliamentarian activists killed as they fled their sanctuary. Byron’s campaign in Cheshire had reached its zenith and all boded well for an attack on his prime objective - the Parliamentary H.Q. and garrison town of Nantwich.

The Nantwich Garrison

Nantwich was a small town on a sweeping rise on the Cheshire plain. Though it was an ancient township it was never large enough to be a walled town, however since it was captured by Parliament early in 1643 the garrison had constructed substantial fortifications. The town had been enclosed by a variety of earth-works, sconces and mud and timber barricades. Perhaps the most important defence was provided by the River Weaver which encircled the town and in the 17th century was fast flowing and deep. Certainly it was a major obstacle for an attacking force to negotiate. In anticipation of a Royalist assault the garrison had blown up one of the medieval bridges that gave access to the town at Beambridge. As part of their preparations for attack, the Royalists had built a wooden structure to compensate for the loss of this bridge.

Beeston Castle - Scene of Sandford's derring-do or Thomas Steele's betrayal

The Royalists were now mobilising for a full scale assault on Nantwich, but one of Byron’s errors was to miscalculate the strength and resources of the garrison. Brereton had left some 1,500 well-equipped men to hold Nantwich under the capable leadership of Sir George Booth and Colonel Thomas Croxton. The garrison was also well provisioned and had made the most of preparing for the inevitable whilst Byron was mopping up Cheshire prior to what he thought would be the coup de grace at Nantwich. Regardless of the strength and resolve of the garrison they were doomed to capitulation unless help arrived from somewhere. Cheshire had all but fallen and Lancashire Parliament-arians were too afraid to assist, because of weakening Lancashire to the threat of Newcastle’s Northern Royalist Army. Unfortunately for Byron, at the pinnacle of his optimism things had begun to go pear-shaped.

Fairfax To The Rescue

Parliament knew that Cheshire and Lancashire were strategically significant and that loss of these counties would pose a threat to the progress of the Scottish invasion. Should Nantwich fall then it was highly likely that the Royalists would sweep through Lancashire and join with Newcastle’s army to force the Scots back. Parliament sent orders to Sir Thomas Fairfax, who with some 1,800 men was wintering in Lincolnshire. Fairfax was reluctant to intervene, as his own men were ill-equipped and poorly provisioned to engage in a northward march against what Fairfax thought to be superior numbers and seasoned troops. However he rallied his men and went to the rescue of the Cheshire Parliamentarians. As he marched north early in the New Year he was beset by problems. On his route he was losing both men and resolve as a result of Royalist harassment, while at Newcastle in Staffordshire Byron had sent forces to launch an attack that turned Fairfax away from his direct route to Nantwich.

Sir Thomas Fairfax

Having lost men and supplies, Fairfax had no alternative but to head for the safety of Manchester where he hoped he would be supported by Lancashire forces. Whilst Fairfax was licking his wounds in Manchester, Byron began his siege on Nantwich.

The Siege

Believing that morale and provisions were low, Byron summoned the Nantwich garrison to surrender on January 10th 1644. The surrender was rejected. On 11th January Byron ordered a cannonade from his battery at Dorfold Hall, the first casualty being a townswoman. Between 11th and 16th January the cannonades continued, with skirmishing between men from Byron’s H.Q. at Acton village and the troops from the garrison. On 14th January Byron received a major setback as supplies of powder which were on the way to him from Shrewsbury were ambushed and captured by Parliamentary troops at Wem. Some 50 barrels of powder were taken, and the loss of the powder could have been a major contributory factor in Byron’s ultimate defeat. On 16th January a second summons to surrender was offered to the garrison and it was again refused. On 18th January Byron launched a major assault at five points on the Nantwich defences. The attack was a disaster as he failed to storm the town; at Well Lane, Welsh Row, Beam Street, Hospital Street and Pillory Street the Royalists were repulsed. Some 500 veteran soldiers, including the gallant Captain Thomas Sandford, lay dead on the barricades.

The winter had been harsh and it was turning harsher still for Byron. On the very day Royalist blood stained the snow and ice of Nantwich the Scots began their blizzard-blighted march into England. The threat of Newcastle was no more as he would be occupied with the invasion. The Scots invasion was a relief for Lancastrian Parliamentarians and a gift to Fairfax, as he could now gain the support that had been withheld. As 20,000 Scots poured into England, so Fairfax left Manchester on 21st January with some 4,000 men to lift the siege of Nantwich.

The Battle

It was not Fairfax’s intention of to arrive outside Nantwich and give battle, but to break through the siege and support the garrison. He was reluctant to give battle because he thought Byron had superior numbers as well as seasoned troops, and believed that Byron’s veterans would better him in open conflict. What Fairfax did not know was that Byron’s forces had dwindled from over 5,000 to less than 3,500 due to losses at Middlewich, skirmishing, and the loss of 500 on the barricades. It is also documented that sickness due to the severe winter conditions had taken its toll and that desertions were all too common. It is worth reminding ourselves that the Irish army were not only battle-hardened but battle weary; many on arrival on home shores would have used the landing to go home. Perhaps more importantly - and it played a major part in the battle events at Nantwich - was the issue of changing sides. Men of the Irish Army fighting popery would be less willing to fight men of their own persuasion, and some would see the Parliamentary cause as just.

Byron could do little other than harass Fairfax’s approach. His army was spread around the circumference of the town, and to withdraw men to take on Fairfax in open battle would be to lift the siege and free the garrison. Byron was caught in a cleft stick, and his only hope was to defeat Fairfax in open battle as he approached the town. Unfortunately for Byron, the fates were against him again, and on the night before Fairfax arrived outside Nantwich the wooden bridge at Beambridge had been washed away by the River Weaver following a sudden thaw. This meant that as Fairfax arrived on the scene half the besieging army was stranded on the wrong side of the river. Obviously Fairfax could not know of these difficulties, nor did he appreciate that Byron was weaker than he estimated.

Fairfax continued with his original idea of breaking through and entering Nantwich. To do so meant that he would have to march in column across the front line of Byron’s army (albeit half army). The venture was military suicide, but as fate would have it, the risk proved a success. As Fairfax began to cross the pastures and enclosures towards the gates of Nantwich he was attacked in the rear by Sir Robert Byron’s cavalry. Fairfax had to manoeuvre his marching column into battle line and managed to do so supported by the terrain which slowed up any rapid advance of the Royalist line. There are a variety of accounts and opinions on what took place and Barratt (1993) offers a comprehensive military account of the events.

There seems little doubt that a sequence of battles took place in which the Parliamentarian rear became the right wing facing the Royalist left wing which was mostly cavalry. This action seems to have been separated by distance and obstacle from the actions of the front and centre. The Royalists initially forced Parliament back, but able commanders such as William Fairfax, John Booth and John Lambert charged the Royalist infantry in the lanes and enclosures, breaking up the battle order of the Royalist foot who were used to fighting in block using Swedish volley tactics which were unsuitable for the terrain. It has also been argued that the volleying tactics used by the Royalist Irish Army were a drain on powder and unsuitable for firing on targets other than massed ranks. The Royalist right wing attacked Fairfax’s van, which by now was his left wing, but they attacked whilst being joined by the remainder of the army which had had to march five or so miles across flood plains to make a crossing at Shrew Bridge.

Parliament Triumphant

By this time the Parliament-arian centre was making ground on the Royalist centre, commanded by Colonels Warren and Ernley. The Parliamentary infantry facing Sir Robert Byron in the rear were holding their own as the terrain gave no advantage to cavalry charges. It seems the stalemate was unlocked when Brereton and Sir Ralph Assheton’s foot, supported by Lambert’s horse, broke the Royalist ring wing. At this point in the battle the Royalist right wing capitulated as they were being forced into confusion by the diverting sorties of the Parliamentary horse. By now the Royalist centre was losing ground and was destroyed completely when attacked in the rear by some 700-800 musketeers who had poured out from the garrison to support their rescuers. Once the Royalist centre had collapsed, Parliament’s centre supported their left wing to bring about the destruction of the Royalist right wing.

The battle was over, and it is recorded that hundreds of Royalists either deserted or changed side when the outcome seemed obvious. The Royalist left wing, separated from the main battle and made up mostly of cavalry, fled the field across the open pastures towards Chester, leaving the foot to fend for themselves. The remainder of the infantry that fled the field ran back to the Royalist H.Q. at Acton village and garrisoned the church. Fairfax, supported by the garrison, surrounded the village and on the evening of the battle some 1,200 Royalist foot surrendered to the victorious Parliamentary forces. Only the cavalry managed to escape. The Royalist Irish Army had been destroyed and all its officers were now dead or captured.

Conclusions

Rather than offer my own conclusions on the events surrounding the Nantwich Campaign and the destruction of the Irish-Royalist Army, perhaps you can conduct your own post mortem. I invite you to answer a number of questions that may lead you to your own conclusions:

• Given that the Irish-Royalist Army spent two months campaigning in a bitter winter and that a thaw caused havoc on the day of the battle, how much do you believe the elements played a part?
• How much did lack of powder and wet powder serve in the ultimate Royalist defeat?
• How significant was Byron’s underestimation of the garrison’s strength?
• The Irish-Royalist Army adopted open field infantry tactics in a terrain of closed fields, lanes and enclosures. How much did terrain and tactics contribute to the Royalist capitulation?
• Byron did not engage his cavalry other than using orthodox cavalry charges in engaging the Parliamentary rear, whilst Fairfax used cavalry as battering rams in the lanes and adopted dragoon tactics on the centre and left wing of battle. Was this a prime contributing factor?
• Fairfax took a major risk marching in column across the Royalist battle line. How much did this turn out to be a lucky ploy in direct relation to the terrain?
• How much did desertion and side-changing played a part?
• How important was the garrison’s sortie into the rear of the Royalist centre?
• Byron left only 30 or so men to guard the garrison’s activities under the command of Col. Huncke. How much do you feel that this was a tactical weakness?
• Which side was best served by its commanders? The Royalists with John and Robert Byron and Cols. Ernley, Gibson, Warren and Huncke, or Parliament with the two Fairfaxes, Cols. Lambert, Booth, Assheton, Brereton and Holland.

The Aftermath

The Royalist resurgence in Cheshire was over and only Chester stood as a bastion for the King’s cause. Lancashire had all but capitulated to Parliamentary control. Only Lathom House and Greenhalgh Castle remained to thwart Parliament. Newcastle’s army was now squeezed between the advancing Scots and the combined Parliamentary forces of Lancashire, Cheshire and South Yorkshire. It was now only six months away from what became the decisive Parliamentary victory at Marston Moor. However in the six months that separated the Parliamentary victories of Nantwich and Marston Moor, Prince Rupert came north, not only to support Newcastle but to regain lost ground and relieve the major Royalist strongholds of Chester and York from besieging threat.

During that period Rupert swept all before him, and like an avenging whirlwind regained Liverpool and Bolton, and relieved Lathom House and York. Chester was free to breath for a short time, but Nantwich remained a Parliamentary garrison throughout the Civil War. Rupert achieved a great deal with very little and was arguably let down badly at Marston Moor. Many would lay the blame for the defeat at Marston Moor at the feet of John Lord Byron who failed to follow Rupert’s commands and made indecisive errors. It seems Byron was plagued by the fates that turned him from hero to villain within twelve arduous months of bitter strife.

Sources and Recommended Reading

• The Battle of Nantwich 1644, J Barratt (1993), Stuart Press
• The Civil Wars In Cheshire, R N Dore (1966), Cheshire Community Council
• Battlefields of The English Civil War, M. Bennett (1990), Webb & Bower
• The Campaigns of the Irish-Royalist Army in Cheshire, J Lowe (1959)
• Transactions of The Lancashire & Cheshire Historic Society Vol 111
• The Letter Books of Sir William Brereton Vol 1, R N Dore (1990)
• Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire
• Beeston Castle- Scene of Sandford’s derring-do or Thomas Steele’s betrayal
• Sir William Brereton
• Sir Tomas Fairfax
• Lord John Byron